During the Civil War several attempts were made by the Northern forces to invade Texas. All these expeditions were met on or near the State's borders and compelled to withdraw after engagements with Texas troops - all except one, the strangely unrecorded battle of Fort Lancaster, where California's troops were turned back, after actually being in Texas.

Fort Lancaster, today but a memory where a few old standing chimneys mark the site of a famous military post, built in 1854, was located near the present little town of Sheffield, some fifty miles west of Ozona, on Live Oak Creek near its junction with the Pecos River. Tourists traveling the Old Spanish Trail (U.S. 290), in going from Ozona to Fort Stockton, and when descending into the valley near the crossing of the Pecos River, see off to the right of the highway several silent old rock chimneys standing as sentinels in the night, little know that there was once located as a splendid fort garrisoned by troops to protect the extreme frontier against incursions of Indians and Mexican raiders. When the Civil War came on in 1861, and the Confederate forces took over the Federal posts in Texas, Fort Lancaster was abandoned for a time.

In July 1861, the entire coast line of Texas was under blockade by Northern squadrons. Several small vessels were captured and commerce was cut off. On October 8, 1862, Commodore Eagle landed and took possession of Galveston. General Magruder, commanding the Confederate forces in Texas, recaptured the city on the night of December 31, 1862.

No other engagement took place within the State till September 6th of that year, when a fleet of some twenty sails appeared off the coast at Sabine Pass and demanded the surrender of the place. Three or four vessels entered the harbor and opened fire on the fort at its mouth. This fort was defended by forty-one men under Lieut. Dick Dowling, and when the bombarding vessels arrived within range, the guns of the fort opened on them. In a few minutes two of the ships were disabled and all their crew captured, and the others left the harbor. This gallant defense by a few men saved the Texas coast from a well planned, formidable invasion. The Federals, having failed at Sabine Pass, sailed to the west and occupied, without resistance, in November, 1863, Corpus Christi, Aransas Pass, Mustang Island, Indianola, Lavaca and Brownsville. But after a few weeks General Banks withdrew this army, except a small garrison at Brownsville and Brazos Santiago, and sailed away. General Banks then concentrated his forces for an invasion of the State by way of Red River, coming up through Louisiana. General J. Kirby Smith met him at Mansfield on April 8, 1864, and administered a severe defeat. Thus ended the Federal attempts to invade Texas. And, as stated, no hostile expedition, with the one exception, was able to penetrate the State's borderline.

But the one exception did, and, strange to say, no official record of any kind was made of it. The Union and Confederate files in the War Department at Washington are blank concerning the expedition and the resulting battle. The source of this narrative is from the account of the operation as told in a book, "The Border Ruffians," written by a survivor, Captain R.H. Williams, now in the library of the writer, and from other sources.

On or about February 6, 1864, the Federal General, Carlton, commanding the District of New Mexico, received the following order:

Headquarters of the Army
Washington, D.C.
Brigadier General Carlton
Santa Fe, N.M.
General: Brigadier-General Wright telegraphed from California on the 3d inst. that he had sent four companies of the First California Cavalry en route to Tucson, and that three more companies will be forwarded as soon as they can be mounted. It is very desirable, General, that you send as many troops as possible down the Rio Grande, to co-operate with General Banks' forces moving up from Brownsville, and to prevent as far as possible any trade or communication between the rebels in Texas and their friends in Mexican territory. This movement will also serve to protect loyal refugees who have been driven toward the northern frontier of Texas. It is hoped that you may enlist a portion of these into our service. As the troops employed on this service will be in position to operate against any rebel force that may attempt to invade your department, it is hoped that you will make the expedition as large and efficient as possible. You will operate without regard to department lines and any portion of Texas which may be occupied by you will be considered as in your military department.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
General in Chief

On receipt of this, Carlton sent Captain Plymouth into Chihuahua to see about purchasing beef, flour, corn and forage for the expedition. He also called on the War Department to place $150,000 with the quartermaster department to finance the trip. He wrote Halleck that he would try his best to carry out the instructions, but that he did not think an expedition down the Rio Grande would at all be commensurate with its cost. He said he would block the El Paso road and then cut the road from San Antonio to Eagle Pass and that was as much as prudently could be done. This is all and the very last we hear of the expedition from the Union side.

On March 2, 1864, Brig. Gen. N. P. Bee, from Camp Sidney Johnson, ordered Captain Benavides, owing to serious interference along the route, to change the routing of cotton going into Mexico to Laredo instead of Eagle Pass, and asked that the Governor of Tamaulipas be notified of this change. The expedition of General Banks up Red River, was causing so much concern in Texas that those in power hardly had the time to look into this threat from the west.

By the middle of March, however, definite information had reached Confederate headquarters in Texas that a considerable force of Californians were in camp on the Pecos near old Fort Lancaster; were attracting to them deserters and Union sympathizers, raiding the country, and assuming a most threatening attitude. The force was estimated at about 500 men. Governor Murrah immediately recalled Major J. M. Hunter from the northwest frontier and instructed him to organize an expedition from the Frontier Rangers to cope with this new danger. During the previous fall a law had been passed making all between the ages of 20 and 50 years liable for service with the frontier battalions. They had thus been recruited to considerable strength – from the best of men, too, for most of them were home and property owners in the districts in which they served.

Hunter issued instructions for about 550 of these Rangers to assemble at D’Hanis, on the San Antonio-Eagle Pass road, early in April, 1864. By evening of April 7 all had encamped, the company of Capt. R. H. Williams of 75 men being the last to arrive. At daybreak on the morning of the 8th the command started westward on the 300-mile ride to the old fort. They covered about 30 miles a day and arrived on April 17 at their camping place, a small clear running stream about 20 miles from Fort Lancaster. The Rangers were all picked men, all excellently armed and anxious for a fight. They did not know the exact size of the Union force, and did not care. They were probably the deadliest riflemen in the world, and it is doubtful if any of them knew the meaning of fear. Major Hunter’s greatest problem was holding them in check.

After two hours rest Major Hunter left Captain Williams, as next senior officer, in command and set off, with three of his best scouts, to locate the enemy position. If he did not return by noon the next day, Williams was to assume that he was either dead or captured, and was to attack the Federals in any manner he saw fit. The night passed slowly to those waiting, and as the following day wore along toward noon, and the Major had not appeared, Captain Williams was just issuing orders for the command to fall in and go to his rescue when Hunter and his scouts rode down the opposite bank. He laughed loudly at their fears and said, "Give us something to eat and drink, and I’ll tell you about it.

He had gone to the old fort, and finding it deserted, had followed a well-defined trail leading southward. Proceeding cautiously, they arrived at the Californian position about two hours before dawn. Within 500 yards of it he left the horses under one man and with the other two crept slowly forward. The moon by this time was getting low but it still furnished plenty of light for the keen-eyed scouts. These scouts had located the enemy’s exact position by sounds too faint for Hunter to hear. The trail led up the slope of a considerable hill, on which the scouts claimed the Federals were camped. An open space on the hillside was thickly studded with their tents. Not a soul was stirring, and not a guard was to be seen. The Californians had gone so long unmolested that they had grown careless.

In a wide open space Hunter saw several hundred horses tied to picket lines and a guard of men over them. Hunter could hear the guards talking and laughing, and could see some of them under a large live oak, dealing monte by the light of a torch. This side of the hill was also somewhat steep and covered with light brush. Hunter had seen enough, and as daylight was faintly breaking he withdrew and made his way back to camp. "The trumps are in our hands, boys," he said. "And the game’s as good as finished – if only we work it carefully and some darned fool doesn’t scare them. Now for a good sleep, and have the command ready to march an hour after sundown. And see to all the rifles and six shooters in the meantime."

At the appointed time the eager command was ready and waiting so they set off. It was a glorious night. A full moon was in the clear sky, and a soft breeze swept in from the south. There was fighting ahead, though, and it is doubtful if any of the rangers gave the beauty of the evening a thought. They jogged easily over the prairie in no hurry. The command had seven hours to cover the 20 miles.

About 11 o’clock they reached old Fort Lancaster, situated on Live Oak Creek near its junction with the Pecos, and on the stage line that, before the war, ran between San Antonio and El Paso. Here Major Hunter halted his command, gathered them around and explained, in great detail, his plan of attack. It had been his intention of leaving D’Hanis to make a direct assault on the Californians depending on the fighting ability of the rangers to carry the day. Since reconnoitering their position, however, he had come to the conclusion that it was too strong to offer a margin of victory if attacked in daylight, and he had resolved to make that most difficult and dangerous of all movements – a night assault. His plan was to halt about half a mile from the enemy, and all the horses, except 150, were to be left under charge of a reserve of 125 men. In holding out this force for an emergency Hunter displayed his military generalship. One of the cardinal principles of modern warfare is to hold out such a reserve. Major Hunter was to lead 100 picked men up the northwest slope and surprise the enemy in their tents. These men were dismounted. Williams, with 250 dismounted and 150 mounted men was to take up a position on the southeast slope, intercept the retreat of the enemy and secure their horses. The moon, by now, was almost down and furnished but little light.

In a few moments the left horses were linked and the reserve fell out with strict orders not to move except by instructions from Major Hunter or Captain Williams. Even that far from the enemy no word above a whisper was spoken. The boys, as anxious as they were, moved as silently as ghosts. The Major and his 100 men moved to the right and were soon lost in the darkness. Immediately Captain Williams, led by the scouts who had been over the ground the night before formed columns of four, to avoid straggling, and moved off to the left. Arriving as near the clearing, where the horses were picketed, as they dared go they formed line facing the hill and waited, with the dismounted men on the right of the line. Not a sound came from the sleeping camp away to the front. To the right front – about 200 yards – they could hear the faint stamping of horses’ feet and the voices of the guard over them. The time dragged slowly. It seemed that Hunter would never begin.

On the almost breathless stillness of the night one of the horses of the Federals neighed long and loud. He had winded the strange horses behind the brush, without doubt, and he was immediately answered by one of the rangers mounts. A man from the guard shouted, "There’s a horse loose. I wonder whose in thunder it is?" Men came running toward the silent ranks, and it appeared that the Californians would be alarmed from the wrong side and before Hunter was in position to do any damage. They were pushing through the brush and in a moment discovery was certain. If one of the rangers tired, all their careful plans were ruined. The Texans held their breath and clenched their teeth.

But at that instant a single pistol shot – the signal to open fire – rang out from the hilltop, where Hunter’s picked bunch had arrived, and next moment their 100 rifles roared into motion, shattering the quietness like a bolt of lightning from a clear sky. This was followed by screams, yells and desultory firing. On hearing the pistol shot, Captain Williams directed his command forward at the double. He was anxious to get to the open ground before the Federals arrived there. He had ordered the 100 mounted men, who had been stationed on the left of the line, to pass to the left as soon as they cleared the brush, and get around the Union horses and prevent a stampede. Coming out into the open range they halted. This space was between the hill and the horses, so they knew the Californians would try to cross it.

For a few minutes the firing continued on top of the hill, then, down the brushy slope, to their right front, came the enemy, a mob of panic-stricken men who sought only to get to their horses and escape. When the space seemed about full of running forms Williams discharged his pistol across the open. His 250 men fired a volley into the mass as well as they were able to see, and Williams yelled, "Charge!" The rangers went up the slope on the run, but the enemy had enough. All who were able scattered into the brush and the command "cease firing!" was given. Hunter, having left a squad to hold the camp, joined Williams and a check-up on casualties was made. In Williams’ party not a man was hurt, for in shooting down hill the few enemy shots fired at them had gone high. Hunter, however, had not fared so well. In charging through the camp he had four men killed and ten wounded. The Californians had 35 killed and about 75 wounded. Many enemy wounded got away into the brush and could not be located. In spite of all that could be done the horses stampeded and it was after daylight before they could be rounded up. About 250 were recovered. The rest escaped and a very few were taken by Federals.

A strong scouting party was sent out to pursue the enemy. These returned in a day or two and reported that the Californians, all that were left, had gone across the Rio Grande into Mexico. The rangers feasted royally for two days on the provisions left by the enemy. Then burning all of the plunder they couldn’t take away, they set set off for Fort Clark, carrying the wounded of both sides in improvised litters slung between horses. Hunter had taken neither surgeons nor ambulances with him and was compelled to remain at the fort for several days, till his wounded got able to ride. Four of the wounded rangers died, making eight in all. The Major then borrowed four mule-drawn ambulances from the commanding officer at Fort Clark and conveyed the rest of the wounded to San Antonio with his troops. After leaving the fort the command remained together for a few days then dispersed, under their respective officers, to their own camps. The captured horses and plunder was sent to San Antonio and sold for the benefit of the command in general.

Only four times, in the Civil War, did the East and West clash at arms, and only two States were concerned – Texas and California. The first, in New Mexico, at Valverde, was won by the East. The second, at Peralta, in New Mexico, was won by the West. In the third, at Fort Lancaster, fought on April 17, 1864 (refer to Webmaster comments below), the Californians were disastrously defeated. The fourth and last was fought at Picacho Peak in Arizona.

Reference: J. Marvin Hunter, "Midnight Battle at Fort Lancaster," Frontier Times (193?), pp. 366-370.

Webmaster comments: (1) The chronology of events leading up to the midnight battle as stated above suggests that the midnight batle ocuured on 4/18/1864 rather than 4/17/1864. (2) Carlton's Californians didn't arrive in present-day New Mexico until after the Confederate Army of New Mexico (ANM)* had retreated back into Texas -- accordingly, there were no known Californians at the Battle of Valverde (2/21/1862) or at Peralta (4/15/1862). (3) The skirmish at Picacho Pass, AZ occurred in 4/15/1862 -- during the short time when the Confederates** occupied what is now the southern part of Arizona -- accordingly "the fourth and last was fought at Picacho Peak in Arizona" is incorrect. To learn more regarding Confederate military operations in Arizona -- click here.

* The ANM, as declared by General Sibley in late Dec 1861 near Fort Bliss, TX, consisted of four (maybe five) companies of the 2nd Texas Mounted Rifles and the 4th, 5th, 7th Texas Mounted Volunteers commanded by Major Pyron, Lt Col Scurry, Col Tom Green, and Col Steele, respectively. The 2nd Texas Mounted Rifles were originally commanded by Col John "Rip" Ford with Lt Col John Baylor as 2nd in command. After General Twiggs and his Federals evacuated Texas in the spring of 1861, the string of forts guarding the military road between San Antonio & Franklin (now El Paso) were also evacuated leaving the military road open to Comanche & Apache depredations. To protect the military road the 2nd Texas Mounted Rifles were divided into two battalions -- the first battalion consisting of four companies under Col Ford were deployed to the lower Texas Rio Grande valley and the second battalion under Lt Col Baylor were deployed to garrison the string of forts between San Antonio & Franklin. The 4th, 5th, 7th Texas Mounted Volunteers were recruited by General Sibley during the summer and early fall of 1861 in preparation for invading the New Mexico Territory. To learn more regarding the ANM -- click here.

** In early 1862 General Sibley ordered Capt Sherrod Hunter's Co A, Arizona Rangers to occupy present-day Tucson, AZ. This company was mustered in the Mesilla Valley, Confederate Arizona by Capt Hunter during January 1862 and consisted of some Texans but mostly consisted of men recruited in Confederate Arizona.

This webpage made possible by courtesy of Chuck Dixon of Midland, TX.